Skip to content

New: How We Design Technology - our seven-layer architecture model, explained in full. See the architecture

general

Ransomware at a Credit Union: The First 48 Hours

11/09/2026

The first call comes from a branch manager at 6:15 on a Saturday. Teller workstations won't sign in, and the shared drive is full of files with an extension nobody recognizes. By the time you reach the operations center, the help desk has found a ransom note on a file server, and two employees are asking whether they should start unplugging equipment.

The first two days of a credit union ransomware incident set the pace for everything after them. Decisions made in those hours decide how quickly members get service back, how much evidence survives, and how examiners and your board judge the response. You'll be making those decisions with incomplete facts, so a clear sequence matters more than speed alone.

At a glance

  • Name an incident lead, move coordination off the network, and bring in your insurer, counsel, and incident response firm within the first hours.
  • Isolate affected systems while preserving evidence, and protect your backups before anyone attempts a restore.
  • The NCUA expects notice within 72 hours of a reasonable belief that a reportable cyber incident occurred. Counsel decides what is reportable.

Hour zero: declare the incident and name a lead

Someone has to own the response from the first call. Often that's the information security officer, with the CEO or a senior executive making business decisions alongside. Declare an incident, open a written log, and record every action with the time and the person who took it.

Move coordination to channels the attacker can't see. The joint #StopRansomware Guide from CISA, the FBI, NSA, and MS-ISAC recommends out-of-band communication, such as phone calls, so attackers don't learn they've been detected. If email or Teams runs on the affected network, assume someone may be reading it.

Then make three calls early. Your cyber insurer usually has a hotline and may require specific incident response firms and counsel before it will cover costs. Outside counsel helps protect privileged work and frames every notice decision. An incident response firm brings forensic skill your team shouldn't be expected to have at 6 a.m. on a weekend.

Contain the spread without erasing the evidence

Isolate the systems you know are affected first. The #StopRansomware Guide recommends disconnecting impacted systems right away and, if several systems or subnets appear involved, taking the network offline at the switch level. Disable accounts that look compromised, and block remote access paths such as VPN and remote support tools until you understand how the attacker got in.

Hold off on powering machines down unless you can't disconnect them any other way. The guide notes that shutting down can destroy volatile evidence held in memory, which investigators may need to find the entry point. Ask staff to leave affected devices alone and report what they saw, and let the responders decide what gets imaged, wiped, or rebuilt.

Protect the backups before you touch them

Attackers often go after backups before they launch encryption, because a credit union with clean copies has less reason to pay. Before anyone starts a restore, confirm where your independent copies live, who can reach them, and whether the backup system itself shares credentials with the compromised domain.

Immutable storage helps here. Veeam, for example, describes its hardened repository as a Linux-based store where backup files can't be moved, modified, or deleted for a period you set, though they can still be copied. That protection matters only if the retention period covers the days before the intrusion began. Work with the responders to pick restore points that predate the attacker's first activity, and keep backup consoles off the compromised network until the recovery plan is set.

Credit union ransomware reporting: the 72-hour clock

Under 12 CFR 748.1(c), a federally insured credit union must notify the NCUA's designated point of contact as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after it reasonably believes it has experienced a reportable cyber incident. The rule covers substantial incidents that cause a substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability, disrupt business operations or vital member services, or stem from a compromise at a CUSO, cloud provider, or other third party.

A ransomware attack that takes teller systems offline will often meet that bar, but counsel should make the call and document why.

Other duties may run alongside it. The NCUA's guidance on response programs in Appendix B to Part 748 expects the credit union to notify its Regional Director as soon as possible when sensitive member information may have been accessed, and to notify members when misuse has occurred or is reasonably possible. State-chartered credit unions also have a state regulator to consider. Report the attack to law enforcement too: the #StopRansomware Guide points to CISA, your local FBI field office, IC3, or the Secret Service.

Keep members served while systems are down

Call your core processor, card processor, and online banking provider early. They need to know so they can protect their own connections, and they can tell you which services still work from their side. Ask how card authorizations will behave if your systems can't respond, what the core can do while your network is isolated, and what they need from you before reconnecting.

At the branches, switch to the manual procedures in your business continuity plan, with clear limits for withdrawals and identity checks. Give staff a short script for members: what's affected, what still works, and when the next update will come. Tell members plainly that the credit union won't call or text asking for passwords or card numbers, because scammers follow outage news closely.

The ransom question

At some point, someone will ask whether to pay. Bring that question to counsel, your insurer, the board, and law enforcement, and make it a documented decision.

Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued an advisory in 2021 stating that the U.S. government strongly discourages paying ransom demands. It also warns that facilitating a payment to a sanctioned party can violate OFAC regulations, with civil penalties applied on a strict liability basis. OFAC treats prompt, complete reporting to law enforcement and continued cooperation as significant mitigating factors, which is one more reason to report early.

Restore in a clean order

Recovery goes faster when it follows an order everyone agreed to in advance. Rebuild or clean identity first, since every other system trusts it: reset privileged and service account credentials and remove anything the attacker created. Then restore the systems that support member services, followed by internal applications and file shares.

Restore into an isolated recovery network and add systems back only once they're verified clean. The #StopRansomware Guide gives the example of a new recovery VLAN for exactly this reason. Increase monitoring for weeks afterward, since attackers sometimes keep a second way in.

  • Hours 0 to 4
    • Focus: Declare, isolate, call for help
    • Decisions to make: Who leads, which systems go offline, which outside firms engage
  • Hours 4 to 12
    • Focus: Scope and protect backups
    • Decisions to make: Which restore points are clean, what the core and card providers need
  • Hours 12 to 24
    • Focus: Reporting and member service
    • Decisions to make: Whether the 72-hour notice applies, what members and staff hear
  • Hours 24 to 48
    • Focus: Recovery order and monitoring
    • Decisions to make: What comes back first, how each system is verified clean

What to have ready before the next one

The credit unions that recover fastest decided most of this before the attack. Keep a contact list for your insurer, counsel, incident response firm, core and card providers, and the NCUA reporting contact somewhere that doesn't depend on your network. Rank critical systems in restore order. Test restores from immutable copies, and run a tabletop exercise with your core provider at least once a year.

Recovery speed comes from backups attackers can't reach and a plan people have practiced. At CTP, we help credit unions design that recovery path and document it so staff and examiners can follow it. See how we support managed IT for financial institutions, or schedule a conversation about your ransomware readiness.

Sources and further reading

Ask about something important for you.

Curious about our take on an industry or technology topic? Let us know.

Contact Us