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A Wire Went to a Fraudster. What Your Bank Does Next

11/14/2026

It's late Thursday afternoon when a commercial customer calls the branch. Their supplier says it never received Tuesday's payment. The wire request came in by email from the customer's controller, it matched the usual format, and your staff processed it. Now the supplier's "new bank account" looks like it belonged to someone else, and the money left two days ago.

The next few hours matter more than anything that comes later. Wire transfer fraud recovery depends on speed, and so does the investigation that follows. Your team has to recall the funds, report to law enforcement, and secure any compromised mailbox at the same time, without wiping out the evidence investigators will ask for.

At a glance

  • Start the recall and the IC3 report right away, and run the mailbox lockdown in parallel. Neither one waits on the other.
  • Preserve sign-in logs, inbox rules, and the original email before anyone cleans anything up.
  • Let your BSA officer, compliance, and counsel decide SAR, regulator, and customer notices from a documented timeline.

The first hour runs on two tracks

Wire fraud at a community bank often starts with business email compromise. An attacker gets into a mailbox, either your customer's or one of your employees', watches the conversation, and sends payment instructions that look routine. Sometimes the attacker impersonates a vendor and swaps the receiving account. Sometimes the instructions come from a real, hijacked account.

So two problems arrive at once. The money is moving away from you, and someone may still be inside an email account that touches your customers. One person can't do both jobs well. Name an incident lead, usually the COO or a senior operations officer, and split the work: wire operations and the BSA team chase the funds while information security takes the mailbox. The incident lead keeps a written timeline of times, names, and decisions from the first call on.

Use phone numbers you already trust for everything. Don't reply to the suspicious thread, and don't call any number that appeared in it.

Wire transfer fraud recovery starts with the recall

The originating bank has the best chance to stop the money, and that chance shrinks each time the funds move to another account. Work this sequence the moment fraud is suspected:

  1. Confirm the transaction details: amount, time sent, beneficiary name and account, beneficiary bank, and the reference numbers from your wire system.
  2. Send a recall or request for return through the same network the wire used, following your wire operations procedure.
  3. Call the beneficiary bank's wire or fraud department directly, using a number from a trusted directory, and ask them to freeze the receiving account while they review. Record who you spoke with and when.
  4. Keep following up. A recall is a request. The receiving bank decides whether funds remain and whether it can return them, and it may need its own customer's consent or a legal basis to do so.

International wires move faster and are harder to reach, so treat them as the most urgent case. Don't promise the customer a result. Tell them what you've done, what happens next, and when you'll call again.

Report to IC3 and law enforcement the same day

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) runs a Recovery Asset Team, formed in 2018, that works with financial institutions to freeze fraudulently sent funds. Its Financial Fraud Kill Chain is the process behind that work. IC3's guidance is simple: contact the originating financial institution as soon as fraud is recognized, and file a complaint at IC3.gov as soon as the fraud is discovered. For international transfers, IC3 coordinates through FinCEN and its foreign counterparts. Complaints are screened against IC3's own thresholds, so filing doesn't guarantee intervention.

FinCEN's 2019 advisory on email compromise fraud says recovery efforts have been more successful when these wires were reported to law enforcement within 24 hours. The advisory points institutions to IC3, a local FBI field office, or the nearest Secret Service field office for help. It also says contacting law enforcement doesn't replace your SAR obligation.

Decide ahead of time who files the complaint, who supplies the wire details, and who gathers the technical indicators investigators will want, such as sender addresses, message headers, and sign-in records.

Lock down the mailbox without destroying the trail

If a staff mailbox was used, your Microsoft 365 tenant is part of the incident. If the compromise sits on the customer's side, confirm the request didn't pass through one of your employees' accounts, and tell the customer their IT team should start the same steps today.

Microsoft's guidance for a compromised account covers the essentials. Your information security officer or IT provider should:

  • Reset the account's password (in on-premises Active Directory if the account syncs from there) and deliver the new one outside email.
  • Revoke active sessions so stolen sign-in tokens stop working.
  • Review registered MFA methods, remove any the employee doesn't recognize, and enforce MFA.
  • Check mailbox forwarding and inbox rules, including hidden rules, for anything that redirects, deletes, or buries messages.
  • Review app consents and administrator role assignments for anything the attacker added.

Capture before you clean. Export or screenshot each suspicious rule, forwarding setting, and consented app before removing it. Pull the Microsoft Entra sign-in logs, run an unfiltered audit log search that starts before the first suspicious activity, and use message trace to see what the account sent and to whom. How far back the audit log goes depends on your Microsoft 365 licensing, so export early. Keep the original fraudulent email with full headers, and ask staff not to forward or delete it.

Sent items matter for a second reason. If the attacker used a bank mailbox to email other customers, those customers may be the next victims. Message trace tells you who to call.

Who does what in the first hours

  • Incident lead (COO or delegate)
    • First actions: Opens the timeline, assigns tracks, sets check-in times
    • Hands off to: Executive team and counsel
  • Wire operations
    • First actions: Confirms details, sends the recall, calls the beneficiary bank
    • Hands off to: BSA officer and incident lead
  • BSA officer or fraud team
    • First actions: Starts IC3 and law enforcement contact, opens the SAR review
    • Hands off to: Compliance and counsel
  • Information security officer or IT provider
    • First actions: Secures the mailbox, preserves logs, checks for other affected accounts
    • Hands off to: Incident lead and counsel
  • Relationship manager
    • First actions: Calls the customer on a known number, collects their timeline
    • Hands off to: Incident lead
  • Compliance and counsel
    • First actions: Weigh regulator and customer notices, review outgoing messages
    • Hands off to: Executive team and board

Customer communication and notice decisions

The customer who lost money wants to know what you're doing and whether they did something wrong. Answer the first with specifics and leave the second for later. The relationship manager should call from a known number, confirm what's been done, and ask for the customer's timeline and copies of the emails involved.

If their mailbox was the compromised one, urge them to secure it now, since the attacker may still be reading their mail. Keep written updates short and factual, and hold any statement about fault or reimbursement until counsel has reviewed it.

Notice decisions belong to your BSA officer, compliance, and counsel, working from the documented facts. Three frameworks usually come up.

Suspicious activity reports. FinCEN asks institutions to include "BEC FRAUD" in the SAR narrative for business victims, or "EAC FRAUD" for individuals. A SAR is generally due within 30 calendar days of initial detection, and a violation that needs immediate attention also calls for a phone call to law enforcement.

GLBA response guidance. The Interagency Guidance on Response Programs expects a bank to notify its primary federal regulator as soon as possible after learning of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, and to notify customers when misuse has occurred or is reasonably possible. A compromised staff mailbox can hold that information.

The 36-hour rule. Banks must notify their primary federal regulator no later than 36 hours after determining that a computer-security incident is a "notification incident," one that has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to materially disrupt or degrade, the bank's operations or key business lines. A single fraudulent wire often won't meet that bar. Counsel makes the call.

Write the playbook before the next one

Claims, reimbursement decisions, and customer repair all go better when the first hours were orderly, and that order comes from a rehearsed, written playbook. FinCEN also recommends a multi-faceted verification process for payment instructions, since a sent wire is so hard to reverse. In practice:

  • Callback verification for any new or changed payment instructions, using a phone number already on file.
  • A second approver for wires above a limit your board sets, and for any request labeled urgent or confidential.
  • Named owners and backups for each role in the table above, with after-hours numbers stored outside email.
  • Alerts in Microsoft 365 for new forwarding and inbox rules, plus MFA on every account.
  • A yearly tabletop exercise that walks wire operations, BSA, IT, and relationship managers through a realistic case.

Tell commercial customers about the callback rule, too. A customer who knows you'll always call before acting on changed instructions is harder to fool.

Put the sequence on paper this quarter

The recall and the mailbox lockdown have to happen together, and that only works if people already know their parts. The time to decide who calls the beneficiary bank and who pulls the sign-in logs is a quiet week, long before the next convincing email arrives.

At CTP, we help community banks set up the Microsoft 365 security controls and response procedures behind a playbook like this, and we document each decision so your staff and examiners can follow it. See how we approach security and compliance for financial institutions, or schedule a conversation about your wire fraud response.

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